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11 Introduction
Public procurement constitutes a large - 15% by OECD estimates (OECD, 2005) -
and increasing part of economic activity. Intrigued by this, economists have
turned to study different procurement procedures and determinants of procure-
ment costs.1 Our aim is to contribute to this literature by studying public procure-
ment auctions of a clearly defined low-tech product, (internal) cleaning service
contracts, using data from Swedish municipalities in the 1990s. The procurement
law of the time allowed the municipalities high degrees of freedom in organizing
procurement in Sweden, where public procurement continues to create contro-
versy even today.2 Our aim is to understand why, in our data, the lowest bidder
does not win 58% of the time, and conditional on the lowest bid not winning, the
municipalities end up paying on average 43% more than the lowest bid.
A number of potential explanations suggest themselves. First, the lowest bid
may not win if municipalities care, say for political reasons, about bid(der) attrib-
utes other than price.3 A municipality may for example resort to a scoring auction,
which balances the quality of the bid(der) and price, or a to “beauty contest”, in
which no scoring rule is announced (Che 1993, Asker and Cantillon 2006).4
Second, “bid preference programs” may explain the data. These programs
award a contract to the lowest preferred bidder, provided that its bid is close
1 The existing empirical research on public procurement has studied, for example, bidder
(mis)behavior (e.g., Porter and Zona 1993), the effects of procurement procedure on production
costs (e.g., Szymanski 1996), implications of affirmative action programs (e.g., Bates and Wil-
liams 1996), social costs of procurement design (Eklöf 2005), and the cost effectiveness of public
versus private provision (Christoffersen, Paldam and·Würtz 2007).
2 E.g. one of the leading Swedish daily newspapers, Dagens Nyheter, has in 2007 had several arti-
cles on the functioning of and alleged misconduct in public procurement.
3 An example is the locality of the firm, if the local politicians care about the firm’s profits. Other
such positive externalities include income taxes and employment (see Vagstad 1995).
4 Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis (2003) compare auctions and negotiations in procurement. They
stress the tradeoffs between hard-to-observe quality and price when objects are complex and con-
tractual design incomplete.
2enough to the lowest bid of the non-preferred bidders (e.g., McAfee and
McMillan 1989, Krasnokutskaya and Seim 2006, Marion 2007). These programs
typically give “disadvantaged” firms preferential treatment either because it is
politically desirable (e.g., affirmative action) or because it is a means to enhance
competition between asymmetric bidders (McAfee and McMillan 1989).
Third, the multi-object nature of the data may explain observed behavior. In
many instances, a municipality procured cleaning services for several premises
simultaneously. To minimize immediate procurement costs, the municipalities
should have awarded each contract to the lowest bidder. In a multi-object context
such a procedure may however be a source of inefficiency (e.g. Jehiel and Moldo-
vanu 2003). The municipalities may thus have taken an aggregate of the bids into
account to reduce transaction costs or to balance the tension between cost minimi-
zation and efficiency even if the rules instructed the firms to submit bids object-
by-object.
Finally, if the buyer has to delegate the organization of procurement auc-
tions  to  an  agent,  as  in  our  data,  favoritism  and  even  corruption  can  emerge  in
equilibrium.5 In Burguet and Che (2004), for example, the lowest bid does not
always win because the procurement agent may manipulate a dimension of the
submitted bid to favor a high bidder in exchange for a bribe (see also Laffont and
Tirole 1991, Compte, Lambert and Verdier 2005, and Menezes and Monteiro
2005). In a recent interesting paper addressing this possibility, Bandiera, Pratt and
Valletti (2007) find that most of the waste in their data on Italian procurement is
“passive” (bad decisions) rather than “active” (generating utility to the procurer).
5 Sweden is regularly rated as one of the least corrupt societies. Yet, Transparency International
(2006) states that “The Nordic countries dominate the top scores in the 2006 Corruption Percep-
tions  Index  for  the  European  Union  and  other  Western  European  countries.  But  they  have  no
grounds for complacency as scandals in recent years have shown that there is sadly no such thing
as a corruption-free zone.”
3To study the merits of the above explanations, we build and estimate a ran-
dom utility model of procurement choices. Because the Swedish procurement law
of the 1990s allowed a great deal of room (and definitely more than the current
law) for politics to affect bureaucrats’ procurement behavior, the model allows
explicitly for the possibility that the award decisions were subject to political ide-
ology considerations.6 We  ask  three  specific  questions:  i)  Is  the  weight  that  the
municipalities attach on price a function of political ideology? ii) Do the award
decisions reflect efficiency considerations, such as the degree of competitiveness
or the multi-object feature of the auction? And iii), are the decisions (in)consistent
with outright favoritism? The random utility framework is useful, because it
forces us to spell out our specification and identification assumptions explicitly. It
also proves helpful in revealing how to think about and control for unobservables.
This paper focuses on politics in public procurement, because the relation
between political ideology and micro-level government behavior is not well un-
derstood. Indeed, while there is some evidence that rightwing economies have had
a faster long-term rate of growth (Bjornskov 2005), that they hand out more state-
aid (Röller and Neven, 2000), and that politics affect firm value (Knight 2007),
evidence of the effects of political ideology on bureaucrat behavior in public pro-
curement is scant.
We report four main results. First, the weight put on price varies with politi-
cal ideology: Leftwing councils are more price-sensitive. Second, rightwing coun-
cils’ price-sensitivity increases in the number of bidders. This finding is consistent
with them using McAfee-McMillan type bid-preference programs to enhance
6 Here we follow McFadden (1975, 1976), who to our knowledge was the first to apply a random
utility framework to bureaucrat decision making. This is in contrast to the burgeoning empirical
literature on auctions (Hong and Paarsch 2005), for our interest is not in uncovering the type (dis-
tribution) of bidders, but in estimating the determinants of buyer behavior, something usually
assumed to be cost minimization in procurement auctions.
4competition. Third, the municipalities may try to take, regardless of political ide-
ology and against the established practice of firms submitting one bid per object,
the multi-object aspect of the procurements into account. Finally, we find some
evidence that in leftwing municipalities the bids are endogenous and that there
thus is some sort of favoritism in these municipalities.
In the following section, we describe in detail the legal and institutional
environment, the product(s) (i.e., the objects of bidding) and the data. In section
three, we develop and specify the model and present the results. We devote sec-
tion four for conclusions.
2 Institutional environment and data
2.1 Institutional environment and procurement law
Our data come from the period 1990-1998, and more than 90% of the data is from
the latter half of the period. During the latter half, public procurement in Sweden
was governed by the Public Procurement Act (LOU 1992:1528). While the law
was not yet in force in 1990-1993, the rules that applied then were essentially the
same as under the Public Procurement Act. This law specified the environment in
which the Swedish municipalities and bidding firms acted.
From the point of view of this paper the following features of the law are cen-
tral: First, while the law allowed a municipality to arrange simultaneous procure-
ment auctions, combinatorial bidding was not applied (i.e., the procurement rules
instructed firms to submit one bid per object and the municipality should accord-
ingly have made decisions “object-by-object”). Second, only sealed bids were
allowed. Third, the lowest bidder should have won. Fourth, there was an excep-
tion to the “lowest bid wins” -rule: A municipality had the freedom to deem that
some other bid was “most advantageous economically” when quality, environ-
5mental aspects, service and maintenance etc. were also taken into account. The
non-price criteria should have been posted in advance, but the weight attached to
each criterion in the evaluation was (in the procurements studied here) in general
unknown to the bidders prior to the bidding.7 In other words, municipalities did
not (have to) use any explicit scoring rules during our observation period.8 Inter-
estingly, the law did not explicitly mention locality of the bidder as an allowable
dimension, but seems not to have ruled it out either. Under the current rules, it is
illegal.
It is illustrative of the atmosphere of the time that the freedom allowed by the
law to deviate from choosing the lowest bid was seen as beneficial. The following
quote from a book by a public sector lawyer testifies to this:
“The tender having the lowest price offered should be accepted.  If it has
been stated in the advertisement that the most economically advantageous
tender will be accepted, factors specified therein can be taken into consid-
eration in the assessment of tenders. The factors can be stated according to
a degree of priority (LOU 1 ch. 22§), however this is not a requirement. On
the contrary, it can be advantageous to state in the advertisement that such
factors are non-prioritized, since this increases the possibility of being able
to choose the contractor.”  (Löfving 1994, pp. 65; our translation and
italics).
Besides having the freedom to deviate from choosing the lowest bid, the munici-
palities were allowed to make two other decisions: To procure or to produce in-
house, and conditional on deciding to procure, whether to allow open entry or not.
We take a municipality’s decision to procure and the number of cleaning service
7 An example of a typical contract notice is found in the Appendix.
8 This has changed after our observation period, partly because of EU wide directives that dictate
that as a general rule, explicit scoring has to be used. However, it is important to keep in mind that
the  clear  purpose  of  the  Public  Procurement  Act  of  1992  was  that  if  the  lowest  bidder  is  not
awarded the contract, this has to be because along some well-specified (and ex ante notified) di-
mensions, some higher bid is “more economically advantageous”.
6contracts that it procured, as well as their characteristics, as given.9 As for the
mode of entry, the law allowed for four types of procurement mechanisms.10 The
main difference between these is that two (Simplified, Open) allowed free entry
while two (Restricted, Negotiated11)  did  not.  We  utilize  the  mode  of  entry  in  a
robustness test.
Another important aspect of the institutional environment is that we study
decision making in Swedish municipalities. This means, first, that decision mak-
ing is delegated: The principals are the inhabitants of the municipality and the
agent the municipal council, or more concretely, the civil servants working under
the council’s management (e.g., the personnel of municipal procurement
units/offices). Second, the members of Swedish councils are members of political
parties. The decision making in the Swedish councils is influenced by political
bargaining and thinking, making the award decisions in public procurement auc-
tions subject to political ideology considerations.
2.2 Description of the procurements, auction objects
and bidders
Our bidding and procurement data come from a survey, administered to all Swed-
ish municipalities asking them for procurement documents regarding internal
cleaning services. The documents are contract notice, technical specification, list
9 It is of course entirely possible that some municipalities decided to procure cleaning services for,
say, some of their schools while keeping the cleaning of others in-house. For a study of the behav-
ior and market orientation of the municipalities of a neighboring Scandinavian country (Denmark),
see Christoffersen and Paldam (2003).
10 The law specified a threshold value of procurement (200 000€), below which Simplified and
Direct were allowed, and above which Open, Restricted or Negotiated were required. The question
if procurement mechanisms with restricted entry can be empirically motivated with high imple-
mentation costs is analyzed in Lundberg (2005). Using the same data as in the present paper
Lundberg finds no evidence of such relation.
11 While negotiations were allowed in Simplified and Negotiated procurements (see chapter 5,
“Procurement of services”, in the Public Procurement Act, LOU 1992:1528), they were not used in
the procurements that we study.
7of bidders, bids, and the decision protocol stating the winner of the contract. We
don’t know if all the Swedish municipalities that organized procurement auctions
in cleaning services are in our data: 59 of the 229 municipalities that replied to the
survey organized at least one procurement auction in cleaning services during
1990-98. The response rate was 79.5 percent. We have supplemented this data
with municipality characteristics, obtained from Statistics Sweden (SCB).
Table 1 describes how the procurements in our data are organized. Pro-
curement is an instance where a municipality purchases cleaning services for one
or more “objects” through a joint procurement procedure. The objects are the
premises to be cleaned and the bidders are Swedish firms. This feature of the data
means that the event of procurement can consist of one or more “auctions”. While
a separate, non-combinatorial auction is run for each object, there is an element of
sealed, pay-your-bid “multi-object auctions” to these procurements. As the col-
umn titled “All” shows the number of procurements in our data is 131 and the
total number objects is 758, of which 721 are included in our analysis.12 The
number  of  objects  per  procurement  varies  from  one  (single-unit)  to  74,  and  the
number of bids per object from one to 37. Some 50 objects obtain at most 3 bids,
half the objects 4-7 bids, and another 200 8-11 bids. We observe a total of 5926
bids. The frequency at which the various procurement mechanisms were used is
also reported. Entry was open (i.e., classified either open or simplified in the ta-
ble) for 48% of the objects.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
Table 1 also describes the municipalities who organize the procurements. We
have data (as of the date of the procurement) on the unemployment rate (unempm),
12 The remaining 37 contracts are excluded from the analysis, because there was one procurement
in which each contract had multiple winners (i.e., the contracts were “framework agreements”).
8population density (popdensm), average income (incomem), and a measure of po-
litical ideology. Following earlier work with Swedish municipal level data (e.g.
Aronsson and Wikström 1996), our measure of political ideology is council com-
position. We define redm to be an indicator for the median voter of council m, i.e.,
it is equal to one if there is a leftwing majority (redpropm > 50%) and zero other-
wise.13 This indicator is a parsimonious way to capture the main division in Swed-
ish politics.14 Leftwing majority councils auctioned 454 objects, rightwing coun-
cils 267.
Table 2 describes the objects. The vast majority of them are schools or day-
care centers. The objects vary according to the characteristics we observe: size (in
square meters), contract length, prolongation period, and required cleaning fre-
quency. The contract length is the stated contract period and the prolongation pe-
riod states the period that the contract can be extended with if the current holder
of the contract has performed well after the contract period has expired. The pro-
longation period is normally one or two years. The cleaning frequency is the
number of days during a year the object should be cleaned.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
The bidders in the procurements are Swedish cleaning service firms. There are
in total 322 firms in our data. They can be divided roughly into four categories.
First, there are 4 firms that operate nationally (“National”). This group includes
the largest, and some medium sized firms. For confidentiality reasons we have
labeled  these  national  firms  “Ns”, s = a, b, c, d. The largest national firms “Na”
13 Following earlier work, we categorize as leftwing council members those belonging to either the
Left Party or the Social Democratic Party, while members of the Conservative Party, the Center
Party, the Liberal Party, and the Christian Democratic Party are categorized as rightwing.
14 E.g. Aronsson, Lundberg and Wikström (2000, pp. 192) write: “These two variables [based on
council decomposition into leftwing (socialist) and rightwing (non-socialist)] are assumed to con-
trol for the widespread belief that socialists and non-socialists usually have different views about
public spending and that a fragmented parliament might find it hard to hold back public spending.”
9and  “Nb”  submit  bids  for  most  objects,  whereas  “Nc”  and  “Nd”, two other na-
tional firms, submit bids for 6-10% of objects. Second, there are mid-size firms
that are active regionally (“Regional”). According to our classification, 70.5% of
the firms are regional. The third group consists of small local firms that only bid
in one or a couple of municipalities (“Local”). 27.5% of the firms are local. The
final group consists of firms that used to be the cleaning department of a munici-
pality, but have at some point been transformed into a company that still is owned
by the municipality (“In-house production”). An in-house municipal production
unit participates in bidding for almost 40% of objects.
 [TABLE 3 HERE]
Table 3 describes the bidding level data for the estimation sample. It shows
that bids are on average 160 Swedish krona per sq.m. (circa 15€/sq.m.).  Almost
three fifths of the bids (58%) were submitted in auctions with open entry (catego-
rized as open or simplified). The table also shows that most of our data (88%) is
from years (1994-1998) when the Public Procurement Act was in force. Regional
firms submit most of the bids (41%), followed by the few national firms (30%)
and local firms (21%). Inhouse firms submit 8% of the bids.
2.3 Bids and winners
On average, there were 7.45 bidders in the auctions. In right- (left) wing councils
there were 8.2 (6.1) bidders. For almost 58% of the 721 objects, the municipalities
did not choose the lowest bid. In right- (left)wing councils, the probability of the
lowest bid not winning is 62.3% (49.8%). The difference is significant at 1%
level. Moreover, some municipalities never award an object to the lowest bidder.
Conditional on the lowest bid not winning, the average difference is 42.9% and
higher in right- (46.5%) than leftwing (35.2%) councils, but the difference is sta-
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tistically insignificant.15 These numbers and tests suggest that rightwing councils
award the contract more often to a bidder other than the lowest but conditional on
doing so, they do not pay on average a larger premium over the lowest bid.
The raw correlation between the lowest bid not winning and the number of
entrants (bids) is 0.17 (significant at 5% level).16 This correlation is entirely due to
leftwing councils (correlation 0.30 and significant at 5% level), as the correlation
is only 0.06 (insignificant at 5% level) in rightwing councils. This indicates that
not choosing the lowest bid is positively correlated with the number of bids in
leftwing municipalities.
It is not easy to interpret these findings. We therefore develop next a ran-
dom utility model that allows encompassing all of them within a single empirical
framework. The model enables us to provide a more coherent interpretation of the
data also because it forces us to be explicit about our assumptions of municipal
behavior.
3 Empirical analysis of municipal behavior
3.1 Econometric framework
The random utility model
We adopt the random utility model (McFadden 1974). Let the municipalities be
indexed by m, 1,...,m M= , objects to be cleaned by i, 1,..., mi I= , and bidders
(firms) by j, 1,..., mij J= . The indirect utility of municipality m from choosing
bidder j to clean object i is:
15 Over all objects/auctions, the average difference between the winning and lowest bids is 24.7%.
In rightwing municipalities the average is higher (29%) than in leftwing ones (17.6%), the differ-
ence being significant at 5% level.
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mij mi mi mij mij mij mij mijU bid q mup fy h e= - ´ + + + + , (1)
where miy  refers to the additively separable effects of munici-
pal/procurement/object characteristics, mijbid  to the bid (price) of firm j for object
i in municipality m (in 10 000 kronor per square meter), mijq  to ‘quality’, mijmup
to ‘multi-object procurement’ effects, mijf  to  ‘favoritism’   effects  and mije  to an
error term. We next discuss the interpretation and specification of these six terms.
S1: Municipal/procurement/object characteristics ( miy )
Let 1 2mi m miy y yº + , where
1
my  is the mean utility of municipality m from having
its premises cleaned and 2miy  is the object-specific deviation from this.
1
my  cap-
tures all additively separable effects of observable and unobservable municipal
characteristics on municipal utility, e.g., regional structure, demographics, income
distribution, voter preferences, and propensity to procure services. 2miy  refers to
(un)observable object characteristics, such as the type, size, location, etc. of the
object. It captures differences in the indirect utility derived, e.g., from having a
clean health center as compared to having clean sports facilities. It also controls
for  the  additively  separable  effects  on  the  utility  of  those  characteristics  of  the
procurement event that do not vary over the bidding firms, such as whether or not
entry to the auction was open and whether or not the object was auctioned as a
part of a multi-object procurement. The assumed additive separability of these
effects and the distributional (logit) assumption on the error term (see S6 below)
allow us to condition both 1my  and
2
miy  out in the estimation.
16 The lowest bid won in 51% of open entry auctions, and only in 25% of auctions with restricted
entry.
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S2: The bid ( mi mijbidh ´ )
The second term in (1) specifies the effect of a submitted bid on the choice, with
mih  measuring the weight given to the bid. We specify the weight to be a function
of the political ideology of the local government and the number of firms entering
a given auction, 1 2 3( , )mi m mi m mi m mired J red J red Jh h h h hº = ´ + ´ + ´ ´ . This for-
malization captures the possibility that the procurement auctions may have been a
‘beauty contest’, in which other features of the bid besides the price matter, even
though the weights are not announced. The specification allows us to test for ex-
ample whether the weight on price depends on political ideology due to, say,
some group of (possibly disadvantaged) firms having been given a preferential
treatment. Also, awarding a procurement contract to a lowest ‘preferred bidder’,
provided that its bid is close enough to the lowest bid of the non-preferred bid-
ders, is a means to enhance competition between asymmetric bidders (McAfee
and McMillan 1989). The weight put on the bid (price) should in that case be an
increasing function of the number of participating firms, because the more there
are bidders, the weaker is the incentive to resort to such a mechanism.
S3: Quality ( mijq )
We write the quality term as 1 2mij mij mjq q qº + . The term
1
mijq  allows for the possi-
bility that municipalities care about the quality of cleaning of a particular object
for which firms are bidding (i.e., ex ante object-level quality differences) and 2mjq
captures the possibility that there are firm-specific, as opposed to object-specific,
quality differences (i.e., ex ante corporate-level quality differences). The exten-
sive documentation available to us on i) the technical specifications of the pro-
13
curements and ii) the specifics of the bids suggest that 1 0mijq º , i.e., that there are
no ex ante quality differences at the object-level. That is, conditional on the cor-
porate identity of the bidders, there are no ex ante discernible quality differences
between the bids for a specific object. The most compelling support for this claim
is provided by the technical specifications of the procurement instructions. We
obtained the procurement instructions of all the objects (premises) in the data.
These are in general very detailed - an example of a typical technical specification
can be found in the Appendix. Besides including a detailed description of the
premises to be cleaned, the frequency of cleaning, cleaning method, cleaning sub-
stances that are preferred, and cleaning equipment that is to be employed, they
also go into much more minute detail.17 In addition, the submitted bids reveal that
firms almost without exception only detail i) the object for which the firm is bid-
ding, ii) the name and contact information of the bidder, iii) and the price, despite
the forms providing space for additional information (see the Appendix for an
example of a typical bid). If such information is provided, it is invariably unin-
formative as to potential quality differences.18  Further supporting evidence comes
from interviews that we conducted and especially the type of service we are
studying. 19
17 For example, it is common to state requirements as to the professional education of cleaning
staff to be used. Similarly, the monitoring of cleaning is often specified in detail, and it is standard
to require the firm to inform the municipality on several features of the working process, to pro-
vide records of hours of work, workforce and machinery employed etc.. As if this wasn’t enough,
in several instances the procurement instructions go into great detail as to how each space (e.g.
classroom, toilet) is to be cleaned. All this suggests that it is very hard to differentiate one-self
quality-wise.
18 A typical piece of extra information is that the firm j plans to use certain substance S in cleaning,
say, school i. The procurement instructions however always dictate in detail the environmental
aspects of the substances to be used, and the extra information provided by firm j is that substance
S fulfills these criteria. This also suggests that the firms were not able to differentiate themselves
quality-wise in the bids.
19 We interviewed a (former) civil servant who used to be in charge of public procurement, and
three industry representatives. While the former civil servant maintained that local firms provide
higher quality through better local presence, he also mentioned a nationally operating firm as pro-
14
Even if there are no object-level differences in the quality of the bids, there
may have been corporate-specific quality differences (i.e., 2mjq ¹ 0). Indeed, the
only piece of information in the bids in which the firms were able to ‘differentiate
themselves’ (besides the price) is the corporate identity of the bidder. To capture
this, we let 2
1
K
mj jk mkk
q X a
=
º å , where the coefficients mka  are a function of mu-
nicipality characteristics 0 1
L
mk k kl mll
Za a a
=
º + å , where jkX  denote the kth ob-
servable characteristics of firm j (e.g., firm type, k = 1, …, K) and where mlZ  are
the lth observable characteristic of municipality m (e.g., council composition, un-
employment, l = 1, …, L). This specification allows jkX  and mlZ  to have a multi-
plicative effect on the indirect utility.20
viding similar quality. The three firm representatives were unanimous in stating that all firms pro-
vide equal quality in public procurements. (One of them, a local operator, maintained that they
provide higher quality in private procurement.). They also mentioned that procurement instruc-
tions in public procurement are so well-defined that there is no room for (large) quality-
differences. Our final support for the claim of no quality differences at the object-level is based on
the type of service we are studying. The literature on the relative merit of negotiation versus auc-
tions (e.g. Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis 2003 and the literature cited therein) is - for good reasons
- mainly interested in “customized goods such as new buildings, fighter jets or consulting ser-
vices” (Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis 2002, pp. 1). We take a completely opposite track by study-
ing internal cleaning services. Our, admittedly layperson view of (good or bad) cleaning is that
“you cannot describe it, but you know it when you see it”. Cleaning is a labor-intensive, low-tech
service, the quality of which is easily monitored, for which the requisite skills are relatively easily
acquired and are wide-spread, and cleaning services is an industry in which barriers to entry are
relatively low.
20 It is worth point out two things about this specification: First, the econometric model already
conditions on miy , i.e., on the (direct) effects of municipal/procurement/object characteristics on
the indirect utility. Second, when jkX  includes firm (type) dummies, 0k jkXa  captures fixed firm
(firm type) characteristics. These terms control for the effect on choice of permanent quality dif-
ferences between firms that are valued similarly by all municipalities. Together with the bids,
these terms thus allow controlling e.g. for the presence of a bid/price preference program in which
all municipalities run a similar, biased procurement auction that award contracts to the lowest
preferred bidders (say, to local firms), provided that their bids are close enough to the lowest bid
of the non-preferred bidder.
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S4: Multi-object features ( mijmup )
There are no combinatorial bids in the data, and by the procurement rules, deci-
sions should have been made object-by-object. However, it is possible that mu-
nicipalities tried to reduce transaction costs or balance the tension between cost
minimization and efficiency present in many multi-object auctions (see, e.g., Je-
hiel and Moldovanu 2003). We therefore include
1mij mijmup avgbidsº ´ + 2 m mijred avgbids ´ ´ 3 mijrats+ ´  in the specification.
The term mijavgbid  refers to the weighted average bid (10 000 kronor/sq.m.) of
firm j (weighted  by  object  size)  that  it  submitted  for  the  objects  that  were  auc-
tioned simultaneously with object i, mijrat  refers to the fraction of objects for
which firm j submitted a bid (also measured using sq.m.) in the procurement in
which object i was auctioned, and 1s , 2s  and 3s  are parameters. The underlying
assumption is that, after having conditioned out additively separable multi-object
features that are constant over firms within an object and a procurement, the
weighted average of the submitted bids is a proxy for any multi-object feature in
the decision-making. The specification allows us to test for the possibility that the
municipalities gave weight to the ‘aggregate bid’ and that this weight is a function
of political ideology.
S5: Favoritism ( mijf )
The term mijf  is included to allow for the possibility of some sort of favorit-
ism/corruption. Because the Swedish procurement law allowed the municipal pro-
curement offices high degrees of freedom in choosing the winner, the procure-
ment offices may have found it  relatively easy to manipulate a dimension of the
submitted bid (e.g., quality assessment) to favor a high bidder (see also Laffont
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and Tirole 1991, and Compte, Lambert and Verdier 2004, Burguet and Che
2004).21
Understanding the role of mijf  requires identifying the sources of variation
that it incorporates: Let jx  denote the degree to which bidder j is prone to look for
favoritism. We treat this as a fixed but unobservable corporate attribute that does
not vary over municipalities or auctions. Thus bidder j is equally prone to look for
a favor in all municipalities. We then write mij mi jf n xº , where min  measures how
prone the procurement office(s) of municipality m is to give a favor in auctioning
object i. We assume that min  is i.i.d. over the municipalities and observable to the
participants. This means that the vulnerability of municipality m to favoritism
provides no information about the vulnerability of the other municipalities and, if
present, favoritism has been common knowledge among all the participants. The
bidding firms were therefore able to condition their bids on favoritism opportuni-
ties, making the bids endogenous if such opportunities existed.
S6: Error term ( mije )
mije  is a stochastic term that captures intrinsic randomness in municipality deci-
sion making. It allows for idiosyncrasies decision-making that resulted every now
and then in the lowest bidder not winning. These idiosyncrasies may have been
driven in part by lack of established procurement practices and by the flexible
legislative procurement framework of the 1990s. We assume that mije was unob-
servable to bidders and distributed i.i.d. type I extreme value.
21 Because the procurement officer could pick any bid, we can exclude ‘magic number favoritism’
wherein the corrupt procurement bureaucrat revises the bid of the favored bidder, or provides an
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3.2 Choice probability and estimation
Choice probability
Given S1-S6, the probability that bidder w wins in a procurement auction for ob-
ject i organized by municipality m is (McFadden 1974):
{ }
{ }
2
2
1
exp ( , )
Pr[ ]
exp ( , )mi
m mi miw mw miw miw
mi J
m mi mij mj mij mijj
red J bid q mup f
y w
red J bid q mup f
h
h
=
- ´ + + +
= =
- ´ + + +å
 (2)
where
1 2 3 4( , )m mi m mi m mired J red J red Jh h h h h= + ´ + ´ + ´ ´
2
mjq = ( )01 1K Ljk k kl mlk lX Za a= =+å å
1 2 3mij mij m mij mijmup avgbid red avgbid rats s s= ´ + ´ ´ + ´ .
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Estimation and testing
We  first  estimate  (2)  under  the  assumption  of  no  favoritism  (i.e., 0mijf º ). The
model then corresponds to the standard conditional/mixed logit model of McFad-
den (1974) and can be estimated by maximum likelihood.
Second, we test for 0mijf =  using the control function method of Petrin and
Train (2005, 2006).23 Applying their method to (2) requires that municipalities’
opportunity for this bidder to do so after all the other bids have been opened (see, e.g., Compte,
Lambert and Verdier 2004).
22 It is worth pointing out that things that do not vary within an auction (e.g. miy ) drop out. One
implication of this is that the mixed logit should be relatively immune to sample selection bias.
This would be the case as long as the decision to procure the cleaning services, the choice of the
entry mode, and the choices related to the particular object are independent of the individual bid-
ders/bids. As many of those choices are made prior to firms submitting their bids, this seems a
plausible assumption.
23 These papers consider characteristic-based discrete choice models of demand in a situation when
not all relevant product attributes are observed by the econometrician. In that set-up, the price of
the product can be correlated with the unobserved part of consumers’ utility. This is likely, if con-
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‘willingness to pay’ for a cleaning contract is increasing in the degree of favorit-
ism ( mijf ). This implies that firms who know that they will be favored can bid
higher and still expect to win. We implement the test as a Wald test, which corre-
sponds to a generalized method of moments over-identification test. We recover a
proxy, ˆ ˆmij mij mij mijf bid E bid Wé ù= - ë û , where mijW  includes all other factors but mijf
that the firms take into account when submitting bids.24 We estimate the condi-
tional expectation using cross-municipality variation in the bid data and include
the proxy, mˆijf , directly into the random utility specification.
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Note that the test is biased against finding that the bids are endogenous: If
there is no heterogeneity in how prone bidders are to look for favors,
mi j mi w mifn x n x= º . This simplifies to mf  if the vulnerability of a municipality to
favoritism  does  not  vary  over  objects  (i.e., 1 2 ... mm m mI mn n n n= = º ).  Because  the
econometric model already conditions out the additively separable effects of mu-
nicipal/procurement/object characteristics (see S1), this means that the bids are
endogenous only if there is sufficient variation in jx  (see S5). The same applies if
there is no heterogeneity in the vulnerability of the municipalities to favoritism,
sumers’ willingness to pay for product is increasing in the unobserved product attribute. The anal-
ogy of this to our approach is immediate.
24 Assuming that firms increase their bids when they expect to get a favor, the bids are monotoni-
cally increasing in mijf .  This implies that the bids are a function of the unobserved attribute and
that they are invertible in it.
25 To generate an instrument for the bid of firm j for object i in municipality m, we regress the bids
on municipality and object characteristics and firm dummies excluding all bids in municipality m.
We then predict how firm j would bid for object i in municipality m to obtain a Hausman-type
instrument for bid (price). By assumption S5, the instrument is independent of the vulnerability of
municipality m to favoritism. Using the entire sample of bids, we then recover the expect bid func-
tion by regressing the bids on municipality and object characteristics, firm dummies, and the in-
strument. Finally, we compute the proxy, include it in the utility specification (interacted with
mred  and miJ ) and test whether the parameters on the proxy are significant. We generate a simi-
lar instrument and proxy for the ‘aggregate bid’, mijavgbid . The 1st stage p-values for our instru-
ments are 0.07 in the bid equation and <0.01 in the average bid equation.
19
i.e., if mi j sk j jfn x n x= º . The reason is that the econometric model conditions on
the firm-type/fixed effects. The bids can thus be endogenous only if there is suffi-
cient variation in min . We are therefore able to detect evidence for favoritism only
if there are appropriate matches in the data, i.e. if firms that look for a favor meet
procurement officers who are vulnerable to meet that demand.
3.3 Results
Table 4 displays the estimation results: In panel A, the estimations assume that the
bids are exogenous, whereas in panel B, we test and allow for their endogeneity.
In all columns, the regressors include mijbid , m mijred bid´ , mi mijJ bid´ ,
m mi mijred J bid´ ´ , mijavgbid , m mijred avgbid´  and mijrat . For column (1), we ad-
ditionally include j mX Z´ , i.e., the four firm type -dummies and the interactions
between them and mred . For column (2) we add the interactions between the firm
type -dummies and mincome , munemp  and mpopdens . In column (3), we replace
the firm-type dummies with dummies for all firms with at least 20 bids, leading to
53 firm dummies.26 Each  column  displays  the  results  of  Wald-tests  for  the  null
hypotheses that (a) the coefficient of the bid is zero, using miJ  = 2 and 7, and (b)
the weight attached to the bid is a function of the number of firms, separately for
the municipalities with rightwing ( mred = 0)  and  leftwing  ( mred = 1) majorities.
We also report the Wald-tests for the null hypotheses that the control variables are
jointly zero. In Panel B, we report Wald-tests for the null hypotheses of the exo-
26 There  are  322 firms in  the  sample,  some of  which  only  have  a  few bids.  There  are  172 firms
with less than 10 bids; of these, 92 have 1 bid, 32 2 bids, 10 3 bids, 13 4 bids, and 25 5-9 bids. We
have re-estimated our model with exogenous bids, and implemented the endogeneity tests, using
10 bids as the threshold. This yielded 42 extra firm dummies, with no changes in the qualitative
results.
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geneity of the bids. The results across the different specifications are close to each
other. As the tests indicate that the fullest specification is supported by the data,
we concentrate on it.
While the bid coefficient is always positive, the effect of a (change in a) bid
on probability of winning (or equivalently, on municipal utility) is always nega-
tive within our sample when the effects of the interaction terms between the bid
and other explanatory variables is taken into account. The Wald-tests in Panel A
show that the weight put on price varies with political ideology. Leftwing munici-
palities  put  more  weight  on  the  bids.  For  example,  using  the  mean of miJ  (=  7)
and the estimation results from column (3), the coefficient of the bid is -157 in the
rightwing municipalities (Wald test statistic = 57.28, p-value < 0.01), whereas it is
-294 in the leftwing municipalities (Wald test statistic = 68.78, p-value < 0.01).
Second, in rightwing (but not in leftwing) municipalities the weight is more nega-
tive, the more there are bidders. In column (3), for example, the coefficient of
mi mijJ bid´  is -42.60 (Wald test statistic = 33.30, p-value < 0.01), whereas the sum
of the coefficients of mi mijJ bid´  and m mi mijred J bid´ ´  is positive (57.75-42.60 =
15.15) and insignificant (Wald test statistic = 2.28, p-value = 0.13). This suggests
that in the municipalities in which the median council voter comes from a right-
wing party, the data is consistent with the use of a McAffee-McMillan-type bid
preference program.
The municipalities have also taken into account the multi-object aspect of
the procurements, even though the procurement rules suggested they should have
not. The coefficient of the average bid ( mijavgbid ) is negative and significant. We
cannot reject the null hypothesis that left- and rightwing councils are similar in
this respect (p-value = 0.31 in column (3)). As for the control variables, they are
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jointly significant in each column. In particular, the firm dummies are highly
jointly significant in column (3).
To evaluate the economic importance of changes in council composition, we
calculated the answer to the following question: by how much should firm j
change its bid in order to keep the value of the estimated index function constant
when we the council changes from a rightwing majority to a leftwing majority and
everything else is kept the same? Depending on the specification (and type of
firm),27 firm j should lower its bid by 50-60% when the council majority changes
from right- to leftwing. The differences between the types of firms are minuscule.
If  one were willing to make the assumption that other firms do not change their
bids when council composition changes, the above calculation would tell that a
50-60% bid decrease is needed to keep the probability of winning constant.28
[TABLE 4 HERE]
The results reported in Panel B mostly echo the above findings. While there
is some variation across the columns, the Wald-tests show that in general, the bids
are not endogenous in the rightwing municipalities, but they may be so in the left-
wing municipalities. Focusing again on column (3) and using the mean of miJ  (=
7), the Wald statistic testing the joint significance of mˆijf  and the associate inter-
action terms is 15.29 (p-value < 0.01) in the leftwing municipalities, while it is
27 To perform the calculation for other firms than our “base” firms (local firms) we need to make
an assumption of the level of the bid. The results are not sensitive to this as the change in bid coef-
ficient completely dominates the value of firm-type dummies’ coefficients in right- and leftwing
councils.
28 Here one should note that we have neither specified (estimated) the game the bidders (and pro-
curers) play, nor backed out the bidders’ types.
For what they are worth, it is noticeable that reduced form bid estimates using a linear
specification and including object, procurement and municipality characteristics and year and firm
dummies indicate that first, bids do not vary by council composition (coeff. of leftwing majority
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only 0.04 (p-value = 0.82) in the rightwing municipalities. This result suggests
that the bids are endogenous in the leftwing municipalities and that this endogene-
ity is related to favoritism. We also have a prediction for the direction of the bias
in the coefficient of the bid: If there is favoritism in the leftwing municipalities,
the bids should be positively correlated with mijf . This leads to an upward biased
estimate for the weight on price. This is what the data bear out: Using miJ =7 and
the endogeneity-corrected estimates from column (3), the coefficient of the bid is
-302 in the leftwing municipalities. This is slightly more negative than what was
reported above (-294), using the coefficients from Panel A.
A comparison of the results from the random utility model to the discussion
of the raw data (Section 2.3) points out the dangers of jumping to conclusions on
the basis of conditional descriptive statistics. Our random utility model allows us
to condition out or control for many variables and effects that may bias the infer-
ence based descriptive statistics. While the raw data suggested more suspect be-
havior on the part of rightwing councils (more often not choosing the lowest bid,
difference between winning and lowest bid higher than in leftwing councils), our
econometric results explain these mostly as an effort to increase competition
through McAfee-McMillan-type bid preference programs.
3.4 Robustness tests
Our first robustness test utilizes the fact that municipalities chose also the mode of
entry: It was either free or restricted (i.e. by invitation). While we are agnostic as
to why a municipality would restrict entry (a possible explanation being fly-by-
night / near-bankrupt firms), variation in entry mode allows the following test: If
dummy -0.0006, p-value .090) and second, values of the winning bid do not vary either (coeff.
0.0007, p-value .274).
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the (expected) number of bidders is smaller in a restricted-entry auction, firms
may bid less aggressively, creating a need for McAfee-McMillan type mecha-
nisms to increase competition. The propensities to not choose the lowest bid and
to restrict entry should then be positively correlated. We estimate a bivariate pro-
bit model where the dependent variables are entry mode (= 1 if restricted entry, =
0 otherwise) and winner type (= 1 if not the lowest bidder, = 0 otherwise), sepa-
rately for left- and rightwing municipalities.29 We find that for rightwing munici-
palities, these decisions are positively correlated conditional on observables (corr.
coeff. = 0.42, s.e. = .09), lending support to the above story and thus to our find-
ing in the conditional logit estimations. In contradiction with the above explana-
tion, we find a negative correlation (-0.67, s.e. = .13) for leftwing councils.
In the second robustness test we try to control for the effects of fly-by-night
firms who bid (very) low but are known to provide (very) poor quality, leading to
municipalities not choosing the lowest bid. We test for the presence of such firms
by excluding from the sample all objects for which the difference between the
lowest  and  2nd lowest bid is in the 95th percentile. Re-estimating the conditional
logit model(s) reproduces the results reported above with minor quantitative
changes.
4 Conclusions
We study public procurement of cleaning service contracts in Swedish municipali-
ties over a period when the law allowed the municipalities high degrees of free-
dom in designing and running procurements. Our aim has been to understand
29 We include as controls municipality characteristics (mean income, population density, unem-
ployment rate), object type dummies, the number of objects in the procurement, and various dif-
ferent time controls.
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why, in this institutional environment, the lowest bidder does not win 58% of the
time, and conditional on the lowest bid winning, the municipalities end up paying
on  average  43%  more  than  the  lowest  bid.  In  particular,  we  have  examined  the
effects of political ideology on procurement outcomes.
 Our analysis yields four main findings. First, the weight put on price varies
with political ideology, with leftwing councils being more price-sensitive. This
effect is economically large. Second, in rightwing (but not in leftwing) munici-
palities the weight put on price is more negative, the more there are bidders. These
findings suggest that politics matters and affect the bureaucrats’ incentives to al-
locate procurement contracts. In particular, they are consistent with the rightwing
municipalities using McAfee-McMillan type efficient bid preference programs.
Third, the municipalities have taken into account the multi-object aspect of the
procurements, even though the procurement rules instructed firms to submit one
bid per object only. Finally, we find some evidence that the bids are endogenous
in municipalities with leftwing councils, suggesting some sort of favoritism.
Our results show that if the institutional procurement environment leaves
room for discretion, the outcome may well be what we observe in our data: the
lowest bidder wins rarely, and the choice of the winner is subject to political con-
siderations. It cannot consistently and entirely be explained by quality differences
or  efficiency  considerations,  despite  us  studying  data  from  one  of  the  least  cor-
rupted countries in the world. This paper’s result on favoritism through the en-
dogeneity of bids in leftwing councils adds specifically to the anecdotal accounts
and  qualitative  descriptions  of  a  small  number  of  alleged  cases  of  favoritism  in
public procurement, bearing directly on the worry that public procurement is
“highly exposed to corruption” (OECD 2005). It also adds to the recent research
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on corruption that has provided evidence of the extent and mechanisms of graft in
developing countries (e.g. Svensson 2003).
Finally, the findings of this paper point to the importance of understanding
better bureaucrat behavior and incentives in public procurement, especially in
auctions in which the non-price attributes of bid(der)s are allowed to be a deter-
minant of the award decision.
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Table 1. Description of how the procurements are organized.
Descriptive statistics and frequencies
Allocation mechanism
Simplified Open Restricted Negotiated All
# procurements 60 32 24 15 131
# objects 129 315 255 59 758
Variable Statistic
# objects Mean 2.2 9.8 10.6 4.5 5.9
Stand. dev. 3.9 10.7 16.3 8.1 10.1
Maximum 27 37 74 29 74
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1
# bids Mean 7.1 8.9 7.4 5.5 7.8
on each Stand. dev. 3.9 4.3 3.3 2.5 3.9
object Maximum 37 25 16 22 37
Minimum 1 1 2 2 1
# bids Mean 6.1 8.1 7.8 6.3 6.9
in each Stand. dev. 4.6 5.4 4.0 4.9 4.8
procurement Maximum 37 25 16 22 37
Minimum 1 1 2 2 1
Contract Mean 1.5 2.0 1.6 1.7 1.7
period Stand. dev. 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.7
Maximum 3.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 4.0
Minimum 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.2
Prolongation Mean 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.7
period Stand. dev. 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.6
Maximum 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 2.0
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0
Municipal characteristicts
Density Mean 297.85
Stand. dev. 611.00
Maximum 2808.02
Minimum 4.60
Red Mean 0.46
Stand. dev. 0.11
Maximum 0.67
Minimum 0.18
Unemployment Mean 7.89
Stand. dev. 2.23
Maximum 13.96
Minimum 1.76
Average income Mean 148.80
Stand. dev. 20.90
Maximum 217.80
Minimum 109.60
Table 2.  Objects
Type Frequency Percent
Schools 319 42.1 757
Day care centers 302 39.9 757
Medical health centers 27 3.6 757
Purifying plants 2 0.3 757
Office 65 8.6 757
Sport centers 16 2.1 757
Libraries 16 2.1 757
Others 12 1.6 757
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Table 3. Bid level descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Bid/sq.m. Swedish krona
(SEK)
160.242 94.088 11 2174
Open 0.419 0.494 0 1
Restricted 0.411 0.492 0 1
Negotiated 0.061 0.240 0 1
Simplified 0.169 0.375 0 1
Local 0.209 0.406 0 1
Regional 0.408 0.492 0 1
Inhouse 0.080 0.272 0 1
National 0.304 0.460 0 1
t91 0.003 0.056 0 1
t92 0.055 0.228 0 1
t93 0.055 0.228 0 1
t94 0.143 0.350 0 1
t95 0.419 0.493 0 1
t96 0.254 0.435 0 1
t97 0.099 0.298 0 1
t98 0.020 0.139 0 1
NOTES: Sample is 5374 bids submitted for the 721 objects used in the
estimation. Sample statistics using all 5926 bids submitted for the 758
objects are close to those reported.
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Table 4, Panel A. Results from mixed/conditional logit
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Bid 24.00
(41.49)
50.55
(42.44)
143.48***
(53.74)
Bid × red -434.08***
(89.14)
-483.62***
(89.76)
-540.03***
(96.35)
Bid × #firms -18.21***
(5.002)
-21.02***
(5.10)
-42.98***
(7.389)
Bid × red × #firms 33.63***
(10.95)
40.16***
(10.90)
57.65***
(12.364)
Avgbid -6.634***
(1.173)
-6.022***
(1.218)
-5.440***
(1.568)
Avgbid × red 3.543**
(1.477)
3.311**
(1.542)
2.357
(2.336)
Ratio 1.930
(2.809)
-0.554
(2.958)
-4.211
(3.182)
Controls
Firm-type dummies yes yes no
Firm-type - red interactions yes yes yes
Firm type  - municipal characteristic
interactions no yes yes
Firm dummies no no yes
Firm-type dummies yes yes no
Joint tests of coefficient vectors
Bid and bid × #firms with 2 bids (firms) .702 .798 .154
Bid, bid × red and bid × red × # firms
with 2 bids .000 .000 .000
Difference between right- and left-wing
councils with 2 bids .000 .000 .000
Bid and bid × #firms with 7 bids
(firms) .000 .000 .000
Bd, bid × red and bid × red × # firms
with 7 bids .000 .000 .000
Difference between right- and left-wing
councils with 7 bids .000 .000 .001
All RHS variables .000 .000 .000
All municipal characteristic - firm type
interactions - .000 .000
Firm dummies - - .000
Nobs. 7352 7352 7352
LogL. -1025.511 -963.693 -808.721
NOTES:  Numbers  reported  are  coefficient  and s.e.  ***,  **,  and *  denote  signifi-
cance at 1, 5, and 10% level. Tests of joint significance are otherwise Wald tests,
but the test for joint significance of all RHS variables for specification (3) is an LR-
test. Reported number for all tests is p-value.
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Table 4, Panel B. Results from mixed/conditional logit
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Bid 48.13
(73.31)
105.43
(82.34)
160.19
(132.96)
Bid × red -481.72***
(153.44)
-556.39***
(163.81)
-531.99***
(196.72)
Bid × #firms -19.49***
(7.95)
-23.25***
(8.960)
-46.30***
(18.06)
Bid × red × #firms 32.64**
(14.76)
39.266***
(15.952)
56.16***
(22.72)
Avgbid -7.658***
(1.714)
-6.717***
(1.780)
-3.723
(3.174)
Avgbid × red 4.947**
(2.225)
5.141**
(2.351)
-2.070
(5.434)
Ratio 1.401
(4.545)
-1.098
(4.900)
-4.157
(5.416)
Controls
Firm-type dummies yes yes no
Firm-type - red interactions yes yes yes
Firm type  - municipal characteristic
interactions no yes yes
Firm dummies no no yes
Endogeneity tests
Bids of right-wing councils with 2
bids (firms) .415 .099 .745
Bids of left-wing councils with 2
bids .000 .000 .001
Bids of right-wing councils with 7
bids .343 .032 .818
Bids of left-wing councils with 7
bids .000 .000 .000
Avgbids of right-wing councils .001 .087 .134
Avgbids of left-wing councils .845 .313 .294
Joint tests of coefficient vectors
Bid and bid × #firms with 2 bids
(firms) .878 .377 .506
Bid, bid × red and bid × red × #
firms with 2 bids .000 .000 .004
Difference between right- and left-
wing councils with 2 bids .000 .000 .009
Bid and bid × #firms with 7 bids
(firms) .001 .127 .005
Bd, bid × red and bid × red × #
firms with 7 bids .000 .000 .001
Difference between right- and left-
wing councils with 7 bids .004 .001 .187
All RHS variables .000 .000 .000
All municipal characteristic - firm
type interactions - .000 .065
Firm dummies - - .000
Nobs. 7352 7352 7352
LogL. -1018.535 -958.555 -805.170
NOTES: Numbers reported are coefficient and bootstrapped (1000 replications) s.e.
***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10% level.  The endogeneity tests are
Wald-tests on the joint significance of the relevant control function parameters. Tests of
joint significance are otherwise Wald tests, but the test for joint significance of all RHS
variables for specification (3) is an LR-test. Reported number for all tests is p-value.
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Appendix. Procurement documents: contract notice, technical specification,
and bid.
Figure 1A. Example of typical contract notice.
“Quality monitoring: Documented quality
monitoring, with representatives from B
and E, should on the initiative from E take
place once a month.”
“Evaluation of tender/bid: Arvika Municipality will
accept the bid considered to be the most advantageous
economically with respect to price, quality,
competence, and seriousness. The evaluation criteria
are not ranked. Bids can be accepted without
negotiation.”
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Figure 2A. Extract from a typical technical specification.
Mop with moped
“Mop with moped. Mop with moped. Conditions:
Mop with moped in easy to access spaces such as
gymnasiums and broad and long hallways.
Estimated time includes manual mop in difficult to
access spaces.”
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Figure 3A. Extract from a typical technical specification.
Workroom:
M12 Dry mop, furnished space 8.5m2 Once a week
M13 Wet mop, furnished space 8.5m2 Once a week
M61Dust/wash furnishing and inventories 8,5 m2 Once a week
VX9 Empty waster-paper basket Five times a
week.
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Figure 4A. Example of typical bid.
Space for extra
information
Procuring
entity
The object for which firm j
is bidding
The bid in Swedish
kronor (SEK). Annual
price.
Identity of firm j and contact
information. The identity is
deleted due to that strict
confidence was assured when
the data was collected.
